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Summary 
Concerns with institutional capacity building in development tend to focus upon changes to 
the structures and incentive systems of development organisations, at the expense of 
considering the role of the individual in interpreting policy goals.  This paper examines how 
field workers use their discretion to interpret and implement policy in rural credit 
programmes in Bangladesh.  It focuses in particular on differences in the attitudes and 
practices of women and men field staff.  The paper argues that these lower-level bureaucrats 
are de-facto policy makers, because of the recursive effect of an accretion of local everyday 
decisions upon programme outcomes and upon the knowledge which informs policy making.  
In the case of programmes promoting women's rights of access to non-traditional productive 
development resources such as credit, field workers are involved in delivering policies which 
challenge local systems of organising gender difference and disprivilege.  Their own attitudes 
and practices have a powerful effect upon the success of these programmes in challenging the 
terms of gender relations.  Most often, field workers' own biases undermine the more 
progressive aspects of these policies and reinforce dominant and conservative interpretations 
of women's needs in development.  In other words, they use their discretion in negative ways, 
to avoid raising issues of gender justice and the redistribution of resources and social value 
between women and men.  On the other hand, field workers may use their discretion more 
positively, to promote gender-redistributive policy -- they may show a species of local 
heroism in women's interests.  This paper finds a gendered pattern in policy enactment 
attitudes and routines, with women field workers showing a greater receptivity to gender 
equity concerns.  There is certainly no black and white distinction, however, between women 
and men field workers in this respect, which warns against making easy assumptions as to 
gender-based solidarities and affinities between women. 
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Struggles over the authoritative interpretation of women's needs and interests in development 
are waged at every level of policy making and implementation, from the headquarters of 
development institutions down to the intimate confines of the household and the individual 
consciousness of policy beneficiaries.2  One of the most critical, yet neglected, arenas in 
which these struggles are waged is in the everyday practices of the actual implementors of 
policy:  the lower-level bureaucrats or field workers in development agencies who engineer 
the 'fit' between national policies and local realities.  Their centrality to the actual 
implementation of political decisions puts them in a critical position to influence the capacity 
of states to achieve policy objectives.  When it comes to implementing policies which may be 
counter-cultural, or unpopular, as can be the case with gender-equity policies, their role is 
critical in determining whether dominant power relations will be sustained, or challenged.  
This paper examines gender differences in the practices and perceptions of field-level 
implementors in two rural development programmes in Bangladesh, one run by the state, the 
other by an NGO. 
 
These programmes have large proportions of women beneficiaries, and espouse GAD goals 
such as women's financial empowerment.  This paper investigates the ways they exercise 
their personal discretion in identifying beneficiaries deemed deserving, in controlling the 
levels of inputs and information they deliver, and in establishing routines of interaction with 
beneficiaries.  The objective of focusing on the historically and contextually specific 
implementation practices of field workers in women's development programmes is to map the 
ways women's disprivilege may be constructed or undermined through procedures for 
managing the contact between women beneficiaries and the organisation.  Close attention to 
differences in the policy enactment routines of women and men field workers shows that 
structural differences between NGO and government approaches are less significant than 
might be expected in fostering receptivity to the needs and interests of poor women.  Other 
factors such as individual positions in class and gender hierarchies matter a great deal in 
determining receptivity and responsiveness at the grass-roots level. 
 
 
Capacity building from a gender perspective 
 
From the mid-1980s,  institutional reform and capacity-building to improve public-sector 
performance has been a priority in the development arena.  This has been largely in the 
context of efforts to deal with economic crises in developing countries by enhancing the 
capacity of public bureaucracies to formulate and implement socially painful reforms.3  The 
task of capacity-building has proven difficult (Moore, 1994), illustrating how little is 
understood about institutional and organisational change, and reflecting a long-standing 
complaint among some observers of the lack of attention to managerial and administrative 
aspects of policy making and implementation (Paul, 1982).  This owes in part to a preference 
amongst development analysts, practitioners, activists and critics for the heady world of 
policy design and the politics of promoting policy changes, rather than the tedium and detail 
of implementation in the field or dusty local office, seen to be far from political struggles.  
Thomas and Grindle point out, '...the divorce between decision and implementation can be 
ascribed to decision-makers' sense that politics surrounds decision-making activities while 
implementation is an administrative activity' (1990: 1170).  But in developing contexts as in 
most others, implementation involves political struggles over conflicting interests of different 
groups, particularly where new development resources are involved.   
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Almost none of the literature on capacity-building considers institutional capacity to 
implement gender and development policy, which introduces a type of social reform which 
can be every bit as socially painful as other kinds of development policy.  The dominance of 
structural adjustment policies and problems over the last 15 years means there is a fixation 
with problems of state capacity to pursue economic reform, rather than social equity 
measures (which used to be an issue discussed in terms of the state's relative autonomy from 
elite groups).  Policies which aim to redistribute resources and social value between women 
and men have never yet been given the same footing in the arena of development decision-
making as macro-economic policies.  Nevertheless, the problem of the persistent 
'misbehaviour' (Buvinic, 1985) of gender policy; the persistent re-routing of gender-
redistributive goals into measures which pathologise women's needs into matters for welfare 
provision, suggests that there is a problem of implementation capacity in the institutions and 
organisations which promote these policies.   
 
Gender redistributive policies have characteristics which tend to create resistance and 
opposition both within bureaucracies and in the implementation environment.   Policies to 
'mainstream' women in development activities previously reserved for men - such as those 
which enhance women's rate of market engagement - involve far more than the 
straightforward delivery of inputs such as credit or skills training.  They involve field 
workers in an activity designed to change the behaviour of large numbers of rural people; not 
just women beneficiaries, but their family members and people in positions of authority 
locally.  The business of expanding women's access to and control over resources, and of 
revaluing their roles in the rural economy, disrupts traditional interpretations of gendered 
need and worth upon which patterns of female exclusion and denial are based.  
Unsurprisingly, given the importance of systems of gender inequality for individual, kin, and 
community identity, such policies can attract significant hostility from target communities.   
 
This hostility stemming from cultural norms exists, of course, within bureaucracies as well.  
Amongst bureaucrats, it may be expressed in the circumspection and equivocation which can 
fracture gender policy rhetoric; in the insistence, for example, on gender-role 
complementarity and the denial of conflicting gender interests, or in the use of gender policy 
to service other objectives, such as family planning or efficiency goals.  Diffidence towards 
the gender-transformatory aspects of policy can also be reflected in the tendency to downplay 
the empowerment-related objectives of such programmes and to focus instead on the 
'technical' matters of quantifiable input provision; loan delivery and recovery rates, in a 
process which turns a blind eye to issues of women's actual control over these inputs.  Or it 
can be expressed structurally through resource allocation patterns which leave gender-related 
programmes stranded on the peripheries of regular government development budgets, as 
short lived, foreign funded pilot initiatives.  And finally, ambivalence towards these goals can 
be expressed in their subversion at the implementation level by field workers. 
 
The practices and perspectives of field workers have been neglected in policy analysis work 
from a gender perspective, which has tended to concentrate on top-level policy struggles or 
on analysing the impact of policies on women and households once it has been implemented.  
This relative neglect of field workers and the ways they use their discretion in implementing 
policy may reflect a tendency to assume that implementation is a mechanical process of 
carrying out orders, and that changing outcomes is a matter of changing structural features of 
administration.  There is considerable literature on rural development administration (see 
Montgomery 1988 for a comprehensive review), but much of it focuses on structural features 
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of organisations and their environments, rather than on processes of active 'structuration' 
(Giddens, 1984); which is about the continuous process of recreating or transforming 
structure through individual actions.  As critics have pointed out, the concern of the 
organisation-centred literature to demonstrate the monolithic effect of bureaucratic structures 
in controlling workers, is such that workers are often depicted as more impotent and 
powerless than they actually are (Bachrach and Lawler, 1980).  Structures become 
overarching, operating independently of people's actions, and individuals become a means for 
the functioning of the system.   
 
Lately, in reaction to this, approaches to organisational change have stressed the importance 
of fostering commitment and engagement on the part of those who people structures (Grindle 
and Hilderbrand, 1995).  From this perspective, an improvement in the quality of field-
worker discretion, to enhance receptivity to the needs of subaltern groups, such as women or 
the poor, should be possible through structural reforms which expand on field workers' 
decision-making power, which reverse information flows from the top down to the bottom 
up, which enhance the participation of local groups in decision-making.  For this reason, 
much has been made of the experiences of development NGOs, whose decentralised 
command and communication structures, and investment in participatory decision-making 
processes, are promoted as models for the public administration (Uphoff and Esman, 1974; 
Korten, 1987; Esman and Uphoff, 1984;  Montgomery 1988; Fowler, 1990).  Another 
advantage of NGOs is felt to be their investment in committed staff.  Unlike government 
bureaucrats, who, as generalists, are used for so many different functions across different 
public sector bureaucracies that they lose a sense of personal effectiveness and organisational 
mission, NGO staff are assumed to participate more closely in organisational decision-
making, and to be more committed to the needs of beneficiaries (Montgomery 1988). 
 
Field worker discretion may indeed be enhanced by organisational changes which invest 
them with trust and expand on their decision-making powers.  But it is wrong to assume that 
this will automatically induce greater receptivity to local needs if individuals are being 
required to implement policy with which they may not agree, or where beneficiaries are in 
particularly weak positions in terms of having voice in the organisation.  This can be the case 
when people are implementing gender-redistributive policy.  The addition of gender-
transformative goals to class-redistributive participatory programmes, and the employment of 
women to manage these programmes, adds complex new dimensions to the resistance of 
bureaucracies and bureaucrats to local expressions of need, especially where bureaucrats may 
interpret policy goals as personal threats.  Bureaucratic discretion need not be a matter of 
visible, formal decision-making for these unpopular goals to be subverted.  It can be a matter 
of subtle practices and personal understandings which organise and rationalise gender 
inequality by affecting the ways resources are channelled to beneficiaries, and the ways their 
voice or participation is elicited (or not). 
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BRAC and RD-12: 'Mainstreaming' women into credit programmes 
 
This paper draws on research conducted in 1993 on the experiences and perspectives of 
women and men staff, mostly field-level staff, in the Rural Development Programme of the 
Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC), a very large NGO, and the 
government's Rural Development -12 (RD-12) programme, a sub-component of the Rural 
Poor Programme of the Bangladesh Rural Development Board4.  Qualitative material 
analysed here draws from 121 in-depth interviews; 66 with BRAC staff, 55 with RD-12 staff 
- of which, in each organisation, 20 were men.  Material from recorded group discussions 
between women and men staff is also used here, as are extracts from oral histories provided 
by eight women working in development.5  This information is supplemented by a shorter 
survey of 455 women and men staff in both organisations at all levels.  Combined with the 
shorter sample, this provides data on 567 employees of these programmes: 332 from BRAC 
(22% of BRAC RDP staff), and 235 from RD-12 (12% of RD-12 staff). 
 
BRAC is the world's largest indigenous development NGO, with over a million members and 
today, over 10,000 staff across its impressive range of development programmes in the areas 
of health, education, and credit.  The backbone of its work in rural areas is the Rural 
Development Programme (RDP), offering credit and income-generating skills and inputs to, 
at the time of this study, well over 700,000 members, 70% of them women.  RD-12 is one of 
several foreign-funded components of the government's Rural Poor Programme,6 which is the 
government's largest credit-based rural development programme targeting landless people.  It 
is part of the Bangladesh Rural Development Board (BRDB), the institutional home of a 
national system of credit cooperatives for rural producers which grew out of famous pilot 
projects in Comilla in the 1960s designed to enhance farmers' uptake of new agricultural 
technology through the provision of subsidised credit.  At the time of this study, RD-12 had 
350,000 members, 59% women.  Both organisations have pursued the 'mainstreaming' of 
women to their core credit programmes with alacrity.  The proportion of women borrowers in 
BRAC's RDP increased to 85% by late 1994, while in RD-12, it increased to 70% by early 
1995. 
 
In both organisations the 'mainstreaming' of women to the central credit programmes has 
been accompanied by a rapid expansion in women staff at the field level.  This appears to be 
in response to a view that women staff have easier access to rural women in a purdah culture 
than do men staff.  It is also in response to donor pressures for equal opportunities 
recruitment policies.  From negligible amounts of women field staff in the late 1980s, women 
now constitute about 15% of BRAC field staff.  In the RD-12, women make up an impressive 
45% of field staff.7 
 
Both organisations follow a very similar approach to credit delivery and promoting income-
generating activities.  Using methods pioneered by the Grameen Bank to adapt credit systems 
to the constraints and needs of poor borrowers, both eschew collateral in favour of peer group 
guarantees on loans, which are maintained through group discipline.  Both bring banking to 
the village by employing large numbers of field workers to conduct meetings in villages and 
manage savings and credit accounts.  Unique to RD-12 is a facility which offers women and 
men members the chance to borrow up to TK 8,000 at a time, considerably higher than the 
TK 2,500 provided on average by NGOs.  Both supplement the entrepreneurial component of 
their programmes with the provision of training in income-generating skills.  They also 
contribute to human resource development through other forms of training and debate on 
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social development issues, including institution-building and leadership, primary health care, 
nutrition, sanitation, and so on.  BRAC differs from RD-12 in that it employs a cadre of 
village workers - the Gram Sheboks and Shebikas (re-named Programme Assistants in mid-
1993) whose primary function is managing the credit and savings part of the programme, 
while its field workers, the Programme Organisers, supervise this work as well as 
specialising in particular features of the programme such as institution-building or skills 
development.  RD-12's field worker category, the Field Organisers, combine the work of 
BRAC PAs and POs; they manage credit and savings and also provide some training.  
However, more specialised training is provided by trainers in the Thana-level8 offices, and 
training is provided to a few members of each group only, on the assumption that they will 
share their new knowledge with all members of the village group.  BRAC, in contrast, 
provides most training to all members of its Village Organisations. 
 
There are structural differences between the two organisations.  Typical of NGOs, BRAC is 
more decentralised than RD-12, with local Area Managers having more authority to 
experiment with appropriate delivery measures than their counterparts in RD-12, the Thana 
Rural Development Officers.  BRAC has an egalitarian working culture in contrast to the 
authority and status-conscious civil service culture of RD-12.  BRAC is also much more 
explicit about challenging social inequities in its ideology, formal policies, and training 
programmes than is RD-12.  And BRAC is much better resourced than the government 
organisation; a fact signalled in many ways, from the fact that field staff salaries are 50% 
higher than government field salaries, to its well-appointed rural Area Offices contrasting 
with the more shabby quarters RD-12 borrowers from the BRDB, to its extensive training 
programmes for staff, to the fact that its Programme Organisers are assigned motorbikes in 
contrast to RD-12 Field Organisers who must make do with bicycles, rickshaws, or travel on 
foot.    
 
One of the main structural differences in organisational structure and delivery practices 
between BRAC and RD-12 is that BRAC works through informal Village Organisations, 
whereas the RPP, because of its institutional location under the Ministry of Local 
Government, Rural Development, and Cooperatives, reaches rural borrowers through 
formally registered cooperatives.  This means that BRAC can organise groups and begin 
dispensing credit quite rapidly, whereas RPP/RD-12 groups must go through more 
administrative hurdles before being registered as cooperatives.  RD-12 activities are managed 
through local representative groups:  the Thana Bittaheen Central Coordinating Associations 
(TBCCAs)9, which parallel an older BRDB system of Central Coordinating Associations for 
the cooperatives of small farmers, a system which has been greatly discredited because of 
endemic default of its better-off borrowers (UNDP, 1989, Chapter 4).  BRAC has no such 
system to promote wider federations of its members in this way.   
 
The TBCCAs, chaired by an elected representative from the RD-12 cooperatives in the 
Thana, with representation from the RD-12, approve each loan proposal that comes from the 
village samity (group).  The chair of the TBCCA also signs the pay cheque and Travel 
Allowance bill of every RD-12 field worker - and therefore has some control over the role 
and work of field staff.  This system is designed to enhance local ownership of the 
cooperative system and to bring field workers closer into local decision-making structures, 
rather than the civil service hierarchy.   It is ironic that the government organisation is closer 
to local decision-making than the NGO, given common assumptions as to the closer 
integration of NGOs than the public administration with local systems.  Working through 
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local systems, however,  can mean being linked to local power structures, which are often 
more inequitable than a more distant, centralised power system, and this is even more the 
case when it comes to the ways gender inequities are organised at the grass-roots level.  
TBCCAs tend to be dominated by men, even though the majority of members in most areas 
are women10, and these men tend not to fit into the target category of the landless, but rather, 
are reasonably solvent farmers from conservative groups.  Inevitably, as we will see shortly, 
besides provoking contradictory views of appropriate measures for women's development, 
the TBCCA system also creates constraints and conflicts in local management of the RD-12 
programme.   
 
Both organisations began 'mainstreaming' women to their credit programmes in the late 
1980s.  Both organisations had women-specific programmes earlier; some of these had 
tended to 'welfarise' or 'feminise' their participation in development by reinforcing traditional 
gender role assumptions as to their roles in family welfare management, rather than 
promoting their independent productivity.  Many of these programmes were extremely 
valuable and successful - in BRAC, for instance, the Oral Rehydration Extension Programme 
disseminating diarrhoea control therapy in the 1980s reached 13 million households.  In 
terms of credit and income-generation programmes, precursors to the current RDP in BRAC 
tended to target women in separate programmes from men, and by and large concentrated on 
traditional handicraft production or livestock rearing.  On the government side, precursors to 
the RPP include a credit cooperative system run by the BRDB since the 1970s.  This consists 
of a mainstream farmers' cooperatives programme and a parallel, but tiny, programme which 
targets middle class rural women with a view to encouraging family planning acceptance by 
tying it to access to credit.  Loans are minimal compared with amounts lent to men, and 
activities tend to be restricted to very low-return traditional areas of women's work, such as 
paddy husking (Safilios-Rothschild and Mahmud, 1989; Abdullah and Zeidenstein, 1982).  In 
studies of women's labour productivity, these traditional activities have been shown to have 
extremely low rates of return compared to the prevailing agricultural wage rate (Hossain, 
1984), relying on a high degree of self-exploitation.  Basing a programme of income-
generation upon such activities has been called a 'ghetto approach' (Wood, 1988:6), and 
indeed, by the late 1980s, the majority of credit and income-generation programmes for 
women in Bangladesh were judged to contribute rather little to women's financial 
empowerment, locking them instead in 'sex-stereotyped, low productivity, self employment 
categories' (Safilios-Rothschild and Mahmud, 1989:28). 
 
In their current form, both programmes promote women's economic empowerment, and 
eschew conventional welfarist approaches.  In assigning women management authority over 
cash resources, credit programmes disrupt structures of gender inequality, to the degree that 
they may enhance the quality of women's engagement with the market, and their power in 
household decision-making processes.  This is a radical project in a conservative context in 
which gender status asymmetry is established partly through denying women's right to 
significant asset ownership or autonomy in the market.  Inevitably, some asymmetrical 
patterns emerge in the process of programme implementation.  Earlier, these differences were 
expressed through differential levels of credit channelled to women and men.  In BRAC,  
loans to women were on average only two thirds the size of loans to men in the late 1980s 
(Safilios-Rothschild, 1989:30).   In the RPP in the same period, members of the Mohila 
Bittaheen Samabaya Samities (MBSS - landless women's cooperatives) received loans worth, 
on average, TK 563 compared to TK 1673 for men (Abdullah, 1988).  In both organisations, 
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the majority of women invested their loans in very low-return activities; paddy husking or 
livestock rearing. 
 
That situation has changed significantly, but different inequities - or 'second generation' 
problems in providing credit to rural women - are emerging.  In 1993 in BRAC, the average 
size of loans to men was TK 2,728, while for women it was TK 2,525,  no longer a 
significant discrepancy  (Mustafa et al, 1995:33).  In RD-12 the difference is also very small; 
TK 2,212 for members of the BSSs (Bittaheen Samabaya Samities), and TK 2,116 for MBSS 
borrowers (Matienzo, 1993:10).  In terms of income-generation activities, both programmes 
experiment with non-traditional activities such as sericulture, poultry hatcheries, or tree 
nurseries, while rural trading has displaced paddy husking or livestock rearing as the activity 
of choice in which women invest, for 54% of BRAC women borrowers in 1993 (Mustafa et 
al, 1995:34), and for 38% of RD-12 women borrowers in 1993 (Matienzo, 1993:9).   
 
Rural trading can be much more profitable than more traditional activities for women.  
However, conventionally, women do not go to market, and the very petty trade in which they 
can engage under cover of purdah, trading in vegetables or cheap ornaments house to house 
within the village, is not a source of very high profits.  Recent research on women's loan use 
patterns has revealed that there have not yet been significant shifts in women's engagement 
with the market.  Instead, the shift towards a non-conventional activity such as rural trade 
indicates patterns of women either sharing loans with their husbands for joint investments, or 
other patterns where women cede varying degrees of loan control to male relatives.  They 
may hand over the entire loan amount for husbands to invest in higher profit activities, but 
retain managerial control, or men may manage the loan activity while women contribute their 
labour, or women may have little involvement in the investment activity at all (eg: Rahman, 
1986;  White, 1991; Ackerley, 1995; Rutherford, 1995; and Goetz and Sen Gupta, 1996).   
 
In reaction to these findings, many argue that this process is inevitable; the household is a 
joint venture, and in a context which so severely limits women's freedoms in the market, it is 
a rational household choice to cede control over new cash resources to men.  In this paper, 
however, the view is taken that if the objective of credit provision to women is to increase 
their personal power within the household, and to shift their rate of market engagement, then 
it becomes a programme responsibility to try to ensure that women get the most out of their 
loans, least from a managerial, income, and skills development perspective.  This paper does 
not deny, however, that participation in credit programmes, whatever the degree of credit 
transfer to other household members, does not still bring women a range of personal benefits 
such as access to training, or greater status in the household, as has been asserted by studies 
which have attempted to quantify the contribution of credit to women's empowerment 
(Hashemi and Schuler, 1996).   
 
Nevertheless, findings as to women's lack of managerial control over their loans suggest that 
increases in women's membership in credit programmes are driven by practical concerns.  
Women's relatively low involvement in the market actually enhances their attendance rates at 
regular credit meetings.  Credit discipline benefits enormously from women's concern to 
defend family honour, by securing regular repayments from husbands, who might feel more 
free to default otherwise.  In other words, the particular nature of gender relations in 
Bangladesh is emerging as a key methodological or organisational tool in the construction of 
the Bangladeshi micro-credit revolution.  As Rutherford notes: 'in my view and in that of 
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many with first-hand experience of the working of these schemes, these practical reasons are 
almost wholly responsible for the move to an exclusively female clientele' (1995:145).   
 
In fact, it is probably unfair to assume that programmes targeting credit to women are 
necessarily concerned with transforming gender relations.  As will be seen shortly, formal 
policy statements avoid raising issues of conflict or transformation in gender relations.  There 
has certainly been a process where outside observers, excited by the success of these 
programmes in targeting women, have assumed of and projected onto these programmes a 
stronger set of feminist policy ambitions than are directly espoused by management.  
Nevertheless, the injection of very significant new material and social resources into poor 
women's lives provides both women borrowers, programme staff, and rural development 
organisations with the option of building on credit programmes to promote changes in gender 
relations to women's advantage.  In investigating aspects of field worker discretion in the rest 
of this paper, one of the concerns is to illuminate the role of the individual in mediating social 
structure, organisational culture, and incentive systems, to see whether there are spaces for 
more expansive policy interpretations. 
 
 
'Kuccha' Bureaucrats:  Ambiguities of Position and Practice 
 
As J. Montgomery suggests in his review of approaches to rural development administration, 
field workers in rural development schemes are in an ironic position.  Such programmes are 
explicitly participatory, which makes field workers, implicitly, co-participants with rural 
people in processes of rural development (Montgomery, 1988).  This is made structurally 
clear in the RD-12, for instance, by the fact that field workers come under the authority of the 
TBCCAs, not the civil service, at least in principle.  In BRAC, this is symbolised by the fact 
that until recently, its lowest level of village worker, the Programme Assistant, was not part 
of BRAC's regular staff structure.   Although participants in the struggles of the poor, as 
bureaucrats, field workers are part of a large, 'distant' development administration, and their 
own prospects for advance are contingent on whether their performance is appreciated at the 
central office.  Even BRAC, with its decentralised administration and egalitarian culture, 
retains a status system calibrated according to proximity to the Head Office or higher 
management levels.  Field workers are also usually materially and psychologically distanced 
from the poor by virtue of education and class.  As representatives and advocates of their 
clients' interests they are required to display a species of local heroism - to show acute 
receptivity to people's needs (Montgomery, 1988:33).  As bureaucrats they are expected to 
deliver standardised inputs and regulate client behaviour to conform with organisationally 
defined priorities and conceptions of deserving beneficiaries - to respond to incentives which 
are geared to controlling organisational processes.  As individuals caught between the two, 
they have to balance a commitment to their clients' interests (with which it cannot be 
assumed they identify), with a preoccupation with personal security and advance. 
 
Field workers are distant from their clients in terms of class and social status.  The majority 
of women and men field staff studied in this research, in both organizations have middle class 
backgrounds, coming from solvent rural farming or urban professional families, and with 
high educational qualifications, ranging from a two years of college, to a Bachelor's degree,  
to Masters degrees.  Almost 70% of men Programme Organiser in BRAC come from the 
village,  compared to 50% of the women.  And in RD-12, the background of Field Organiser 
is even less linked to a rural experience; 50% of the men come from the village, compared to 
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30% of the women.  Fewer women than men, however, come from village backgrounds.  
Only in BRAC is there a category of staff of the type associated with grass-roots 
participatory rural development work -- the village-level Programme Assistants.  About 60% 
of women PAs came from the village, as did about 80% of the men, and all have secondary 
school degrees.   The majority of all categories of field staff are under 35 and represent a 
modern, professional cadre of development workers, most of them - perhaps especially the 
village-level Programme Assistants - with aspirations to move away from village work into 
higher-status managerial work.  This situates them socially far from the participatory ideal 
which sees field workers in shared struggles with the poor. 
 
Some of these contradictions in the roles of field level bureaucrats are captured in 
Montgomery's near-oxymoronic description of them as 'bureaucratic populists' (1988: xvii).  
In a Bangladeshi context, this could be expressed in the term:  kuccha bureaucrats.  'Kuccha' 
in Bengali has a number of connotations.  Among its literal translations are 'raw', 'unfinished' 
or 'naive', in contrast to 'pucca' or 'finished', 'professional', 'correct'.  It is used to describe the 
rural constructions of dwellings, feeder roads, and paths of dried mud -- the physical context 
in which field staff work.  The term indicates the contingent, improvised, ambiguous role of 
field workers. 
 
There are ambiguities in the position and work of field workers which are peculiar to gender 
and development programmes, which are related to the resistance gender policy generates 
within and outside of development bureaucracies.  As noted earlier, resistance can be 
expressed in diffidence about pursuing the more radical aspects of efforts to promote gender 
equity in development, or in outright hostility leading to the direct undermining of policy 
goals. These behaviours can be shared by field workers as well.  Most important, however, is 
the fact that field workers on these programmes may be in the least desirable positions in 
their organisations from a career point of view -- careers are not made in the field (at least, 
not civil service careers), nor on women's programmes. 
 
Michael Lipsky's study of 'street-level bureaucrats' in the US (1980), provides a guide to 
analysing other ambiguities and constraints in the work environment of lower-level 
bureaucrats.  Their work is structured by top-level policy directives, which they are expected 
to implement in environments which policy cannot predict, amongst beneficiaries who may 
not fit policy descriptions, using uncertain methods with inadequate resources.  Their role is 
essentially to manage a chaotic situation, for which they invent ad hoc coping strategies.  
Goals are unclear, and do not always spell out implications for implementation.  This is 
certainly true in the context of programmes addressing women's disadvantage in 
development. Do the goals of women's financial empowerment and poverty alleviation, for 
example, imply not just facilitating loan access but also monitoring the use of that income?  
BRAC and RD-12 'human development' goals which include functional numeracy, family 
health, improved sanitation, and social awareness, demand considerable creativity fromfield 
workers.  Achievements are hard to monitor and are 'more like receding horizons than fixed 
targets' (Landau, 1973:536, cited in Lipsky, 1980:40).  The unclarity of goals contributes to 
the ambiguity of field workers' roles. Are they expected to be policers of loan use or 
motivators of new levels of awareness and behaviour amongst their beneficiaries?  According 
to Lipsky, to cope with uncertainty of purpose and non-compliant work environments, lower-
level bureaucrats use their discretion to develop labels to create simplified and coherent 
conceptions of their clients, routines to limit beneficiary demands on and expectations of 
their efforts, and rationalisations to modify their own understandings of the purpose of their 
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work (Lipsky, 1980).  This paper uses Lipsky's framework to investigate field worker 
discretion by examining the representations they develop to describe beneficiaries and define 
their needs, and their routines of policy enactment which limit beneficiary demands and 
expectations, and indeed their own expectations of the purpose of their work. 
 
Simplifications:  Labels and Bias 
 
Representations of gender difference, and interpretations of women and men's needs, come 
out in the simplifications, routines, and rationalisations of field workers.  Thesefield workers 
receive authoritative representations, in the form of labels designating the deserving 'target' of 
policy intervention, from their organisations.  As Wood has shown, there is a history of 
competition in Bangladesh for the definitive object of state development intervention; the 
Comilla/BRDB model targeted small farmers, but currently the 'donative discourse' has 
labelled the landless and poor women as the most important policy targets (1985:109). 
 
The content with which field workers 'flesh out' these labels, however, is coloured by their 
own representations of gender and worth.  There is a continuous interplay between elements 
of control and standardisation from management versus elements of field worker discretion 
and deviation from rules in the field.  Policy elites provide directives, rules, levels of benefits, 
categories of eligibility; each of which define the deserving object of policy and predict their 
needs.  The structure of field administration, as well as occupational and community norms, 
also shapes the practices of field workers, and leads to some standardisation of their work.  
On the other hand, the sheer distance of field administrations from the centre, the isolation of 
field work, and the low levels of direct supervision, give field workers considerable freedom 
in acting on their own interpretations and preferences.   
 
 
Attitudes towards women's work 
Respondents were asked about the kind of work which poor rural women do, in order to 
assess gender differences in perspectives on 'work' and women's productivity and social 
value.  Since a central tenet of the gender division of labour in many cultures is that women's 
work is neither productive nor socially significant, the objective was to determine whether 
programme staff had reflected on the injustice and inaccuracy of ideologies of the 
insignificance of women's labour.   
 
Across both programmes, and almost equally for men and women, the response was that poor 
rural women 'do not work' - kaj kori na.  A typical view was expressed by a male field 
worker in the NGO: 'You know, women are illiterate, they are actually not doing anything 
productive in society, they lack capacity, and lack the habit of working or using skills...' 
(group discussion, Jamalpur, 17.5.93).   This view of women as non-productive is central to 
an entire cultural system which justifies asymmetrical rights, access to resources, and social 
value between women and men, on the grounds that women's economic contribution is 
negligible.  The view that only wage employment outside of the home is considered 'work' is 
implicit in the observation of a male field worker in the NGO, who explained that women 
staff had nothing in common with women beneficiaries because 'the main difference is that 
our women work' (9)  This is a perspective which is deeply engrained and is shared at all 
levels of hierarchies in the organisations studied; as suggested by a statement from a very 
high ranking male manager in the government organisation: 'Women don't have any work to 
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do, only house work.  If we can involve them in income-generating activity, whatever they 
earn improves household survival.  It even improves family planning behaviour' (107).11   
 
This last statement defers to the purdah paradigm in reporting women's activities as being 
rightly restricted to the domestic sphere; even if they do not 'work', they can be helped to 
improve their contribution to the well-being of the domestic sphere.  This makes a clear 
distinction between, and assigns differential value to 'outside' and 'inside' work.  
Conceptually, this repeats the logic which de-values women's contribution in the first place, 
because it is not seen as having a legitimate place, or impact on, the 'outside' world. 
 
Although most women respondents also shared this view that women do not work, some of 
them challenged the justice of ignoring or undervaluing women's reproductive labour.  As 
one woman field manager in the government organisation noted: 'In our country women are 
very backward.  They are not getting value for their labour but men get value for their labour.  
Women are working in the house but there is no money for that' (20).  Some women drew 
parallels with the way their own work was valued: 'Village women don't get proper 
recognition for their housework - neither do I!' (Government field manager, 63).  Indeed, 
women staff often illustrated problems of village women by drawing parallels in their own 
lives.  This suggests a capacity, as women, to be receptive to aspects of beneficiaries' 
situations to which men are less sensitive.   The limits of this capacity to identify points of 
similarity on the basis of gender, in spite of class differences, will be discussed later. 
 
The following extract from a taped group discussion between women and men field workers 
on the government programme illustrates some of the above points about men and women's 
different perspectives on work.  The debate oscillated between discussing the work of village 
women and the work of women field staff: 
 
Woman 1: A women contributes more to society. 
Man 1: You're saying that a woman works harder than a man?! 
Woman 1: What I mean is ... 
Man 2: Where we spend two hours working with a samity (group),  they work 
 half an hour.  How is that working more? 
Woman 2: Hey!  That's not right!  That's not the way it is! 
Man 3: Okay, let's find out what they're trying to say. 
Woman 1: A woman contributes more to the whole society.  She is contributing to 
 her household ... to her husband's household ... that is to say, in a 
family  where both the husband and the wife work, the husband has his food 
 prepared for him before he goes to the office.  And if there is anything 
 out of place, she'll get it.  And [she] has to do all the work and look 
 after the children given by that husband before she comes to the office.  
 And after she goes home from the office, she has to do all the cooking 
 and cleaning! 
Man 2: Why are you dragging domestic duties into the office? 
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(All the men together):   Outside we have to do all the work! 
Man 3: We are giving the women money, as loans.  The kinds of things 
women  produce, for example, like goats, cows, ducks, planting trees - women 
 can't go to the market for these things.  They don't have the courage.  
 They don't have that ability. 
Woman 1: Whose fault is that?  It's society's fault!  If we go to the markets, they 
 won't accept it!  It's society's fault! 
Man 1: Let's say a woman is given 500 takas to buy goats.  The woman then 
 gives that money to her husband.  Her husband buys it for 200 takas, 
 and tricks her.  He may steal the rest of the money, or whatever.  If the 
 women could have gone to the market herself ... 
Woman 3: Who is doing this?  They aren't letting her go to the market!  They 
 aren't accepting it!  You may not be doing it, but ten other men like 
you  are doing it! 
Man 1: Then the problem is women's! (everyone laughs) 
Woman 3: If a woman works, her domestic duties don't disappear.  She has to 
 work even harder to manage her family as well. 
Man 2: We are accepting what you say, but it is not right to say that only 
 women work and that men don't. 
Man 3: Do you work more than us? 
Woman 1: Why don't you compare and see? 
Man 2: They do, they do work harder.  But the work that we do in one hour, 
 they do in six! 
Woman 1: Here we aren't just talking about the field.  Here we are talking about 
 both. 
Man 3: Why are you dragging the household in here? 
 
Evident in the above exchange is men's persistence in maintaining a separation between 
private and public forms of work, and a rejection of the significance of domestic labour or its 
relevance to the experience of 'work' - which is clear from the repeated objection to women's 
references to their work at home.  Importantly, men also insist that their women colleagues 
are not working as hard or as effectively as men do.  Insisting on the differential quality of 
women and men's labour - even if both are working in exactly the same ways, in the same 
arena - and insisting on devaluing women's reproductive work,  is critical to justifying male 
dominance and privileges in the 'public' arena. 
 
The devaluing of women's work capacity is also used by men in the above example to justify 
practices amongst beneficiaries of husbands investing women's loans.  Women beneficiaries 
are described as being incapable of investing money well ('They don't have the courage.  
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They don't have that ability').  Women field staff point out that the problem is that women are 
actively constrained from going to the market; power relations prevent positive change.  
Further indication of differential receptivity to constraints faced by rural women emerged 
from field workers' accounts of problems in motivating and training village women.  Male 
staff often spoke dismissively of rural women's interest in training: 'We are trying to 
conscientise village women through training and motivation, but without much effect - they 
are still dependent on men.  They don't want to go for training or any learning opportunities.  
They're afraid of it' (NGO field worker, 85).  In contrast, women staff suggested that 
problems of low turn-out for training sessions were caused by husbands preventing women's 
participation: 
 
When there is any residential training husbands don't want to let wives go.  Even to 
get loans women have to come to BRAC offices.  Husbands want to come and take 
the loans instead (...)  Women's husbands are the biggest obstacle.  Husbands think 
that if their wives come to groups they'll learn more and won't obey them, and all the 
domestic work won't get done. (NGO field worker, woman, 36). 
 
Where men staff used the word 'dependent' to describe rural women, women staff often used 
words like 'oppressed'. 
 
Labels which stereotype women's backwardness as caused by their own ignorance, low 
confidence, narrow-mindedness, can be useful tofield workers in rationalising the gap 
between expansive policy objectives and meagre accomplishments.  Women are presented as 
timorous and susceptible, and a spurious justification is provided for the fact that few women 
engage in high-profit non-traditional activities; or that some women cede loan control to their 
husbands, or that few women take up opportunities for training.  Simplified perceptions of 
women's low productivity conveniently displace responsibility for the shortcomings of policy 
implementation onto beneficiaries themselves.  A proclivity to blame what is in effect a 
policy failure - husbands using women's loans - on women's incompetence or conservatism, 
absolves field workers of responsibility.  
 
Simplified and negative representations of women's work, capabilities, and constraints fail to 
make reference to antecedent events and structures which have denied women education, or 
forced them to comply with male authority in order to survive.  Women are presented as 
helpless, hopeless 'cases', and their full 'stories' - how they got to where they are now - are 
abridged.12  Thus negative representations of women's capabilities become self-fulfilling 
prophecies.  However, whilefield workers can be expected to simplify their perceptions of 
beneficiaries, Lipsky points out that 'the extent to which they are open to fresh information 
contradicting facile categorisations (...) is not predetermined' (1980:85).  The more expansive 
perceptions of women field workers is indicative of a capacity for receptivity to new 
perspectives on women's situation and needs, and of a capacity for empathy based on shared 
experiences of subordination. 
 
Perspectives on policy legitimacy 
The content of representations also comes out infield workers' views on the legitimacy of 
gender equity policy.  If they sense a lack of genuine commitment from policy makers, if 
gender redistributive policy is seen as a mere hollow promise designed to placate external 
donors, field workers may feel freer to indulge their own biases and ignore or underachieve 
on policy objectives.  After all, a demonstrated affinity with gender equity goals is not a 
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requirement offield workers at recruitment13, nor is their performance ever assessed on the 
basis of their contribution to these goals.   
 
Respondents were asked about the reasons for their organisation's policy change with a view 
to discovering their perspectives on the validity or relevance of working with ever-increasing 
numbers of women.  Hardly any respondents, men or women, in either organisation, 
explained the policy shift by referring to the project of challenging inequities in gender 
relations.  Instead, most offered pragmatic reasons, arguing that women were much more 
tractable group members and more disciplined loan repayers than men.  This response from a 
man field worker on the government programme was typical: '[Earlier] experiences with male 
groups was bad.  It is easy to work with women's groups - they work and talk nicely, (...) they 
attend meetings regularly, we can find them at home, that's why RPP is giving priority to 
them ' (13).   
 
Most staff consider this a perfectly legitimate reason for working with women; it contributes 
to what is understood as the main objective of these programmes:  efficient credit 
management.  This is implied by the candid admission of a male government field worker: 
'We are much better at getting our loan money back now that we are using women as middle-
men (sic)' (14) Most field workers justify this with essentialist views on women and men's 
'nature', where they associate masculinity with rebelliousness and femininity with stereotyped 
views of women's greater concern with maintaining family honour and propriety by keeping 
up loan repayments.  As another man field worker on the government programme said: 'I 
believe that women have special power to manage and motivate.  When we gave loans to 
women we found them to be very regular.  Even though men are the real users of loans, 
women have a capacity for convincing them to repay, even when they are quarrelling' (9).  A 
woman field worker in the NGO said: 'Men's groups work according to their own views and 
decisions and are hard to motivate.  Women are easy to motivate because they are obedient' 
(34).  In these views, field workers' views diverge little from dominant and conservative local 
systems for signifying differences in gender identity and affectivity, such as expressed by this 
chairman of a TBCCA, a solvent farmer: 
 
'Although men are touts, men are repaying their wives' loans because they get 
pressure from their wives.  We give loans to women and tell them they have to return 
it because it is government money.  Women are sincere.  They give money to their 
husbands and insist that they give back the instalments.  Men's character and women's 
character is not the same.  Women like to have savings.  Before the instalment day 
they pressure their husbands for days and days. (...) Usually the men misuse the 
money, they smoke cigarettes, they like to hang around the market, sit in restaurants, 
and spend the money on other women'. 
 
Such views stereotype men's social and economic roles as much as they do women's.  They 
offer few prospects for considering change in gender relations towards greater autonomy for 
women, or indeed, responsibility for men.  Instead, they justify programme delivery 
approaches which rely upon exploiting women's tractability in the interests of programme 
efficiency, not women's empowerment.  These perspectives minimise the significance and 
legitimacy of women's independent need for policy attention.  Instead, women's needs are 
subordinated to a programme concern with recovering loans. 
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The relative absence of rhetoric of women's empowerment in explanations for the policy of 
lending to women provokes a question about how in fact policy messages and justifications 
for policy changes are transmitted to the field.  And indeed, what is the formal GAD policy of 
these programmes?  In both programmes, formal policy statements regarding gender have 
tended to be produced after effective policy shifts have occurred through changing practice at 
the field level.  Field workers began organising greater numbers of women borrowers in the 
mid to late 1980s, and in the early 1990s, this received more formal, official 
acknowledgement and justification.  In neither programme was there a detailed gender and 
development policy statement at the time of this study.  Both programmes stress that their 
primary objective and policy is to improve the social and economic status of the rural poor, 
and both began using the term 'empowerment' to describe this in the early 1990s.  A gender 
dimension is added through statements stressing that women are to be included equitably in 
all development interventions.  However, neither programme raises gender relations and 
problems of conflict as being part of 'women's empowerment'.  BRAC, like many NGOs, 
does raise issues of class conflict and competing community interests in its analysis of 
poverty and its justifications for working with the poor, but gender relations tend not to be 
included in this kind of social analysis.  A formal justification for working with women in a 
1992 BRAC/RDP project document stresses practical reasons: '...in all areas of the 
programme, women's participation is higher than men's.(...)  Firstly, women have a positive 
attitude towards participation in development activity.  Secondly, women are more interested 
in saving than men are.  Thirdly, there are more women engaged in economic activities' 
(BRAC, 1992).  This echoes the explanations provided by field workers. 
 
In RD-12, in 1991, efforts were made by the project's foreign advisory team in close 
relationship with the government staff to develop more explicit policy on social development 
and gender equity.  'Social development' was defined as 'the empowerment process which 
promotes critical consciousness leading to:  human dignity; release of creative potential of 
the poor; equity; social justice; and genuine democracy' (RD-12, 1991a: 3).  Among the 
actions required to achieve this are promoting equity for women, ensuring that income-
generating activities do not discriminate on the basis of gender,  and ensuring that one half of 
participants in the project are women.  This last concern is extended to staff, where there is 
an explicit policy of promoting women's participation both as field workers and as 
beneficiaries (RD-12, 1991b: 3).  Here, as in BRAC, formal statements of policy on gender 
issues, and their justifications, tend to add women onto the general category of the poor; 
gender relations are not specifically addressed, nor are the different constraints and 
conditions affecting the participation of women in particular, as distinct from the poor in 
general.  In RD-12, more explicitly feminist accounts of the rationale for working with 
women can be found in evaluation and appraisal documents (eg:  Manoukian, 1991), but 
these tend to be produced by the foreign advisors to the project, and are neither representative 
of official views, nor are they available to the general staff body. 
 
In both programmes, then, formal statements of gender policy tend to make a point of 
including women as specific targets of development efforts, and although both express a 
commitment to women's 'empowerment', they offer little by way of analysing the 
complexities of such a project in a gender-segregated society.  Formal policy in both 
organisations is transmitted to the broader staff body primarily through training; field-level 
staff are rarely made direct party to processes of policy development.  However, neither 
organisation had set up GAD training for all staff at the time of this study.  Since then, BRAC 
has embarked on a comprehensive gender training programme, and has opened up internal 
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debate on the meaning of gender and development.  Nothing like this has happened in the less 
well-resourced RD-12.  There, training in gender and social analysis is offered to staff at field 
manager and higher levels only, with field-level managers (ARDOs an TRDOs) expected to 
communicate information on gender analysis to their field staff.  In addition, a special 
training programme on women's leadership was available for women managers.  However, at 
the time of the research, both organisations did include brief modules on gender relations in 
their basic social development induction training for field workers, which meant that in 
principle, all field workers had been exposed to some discussion of gender and development. 
 
Respondents were therefore asked if they had heard of 'gender and development', and if so, 
what it meant.  In both organisations, women were more familiar with the term than men, 
their higher recall of the term suggesting greater interest in it.  In BRAC,  about one third of 
women field staff compared to 20% of their male colleagues understood that GAD was about 
changing gender relations.  In RD-12, again, about one third of women field staff understood 
the term, compared to none of the men at all.  About one quarter of the men in each 
organisation assumed that the term referred to a 'WID' preoccupation with providing women 
with employment and 'bringing them to the level of men'.  Some male field managers in the 
government organisation did not even know that their organisation had an interest in gender 
equity issues.  Differences in men's exposure to the term 'GAD' between the two 
organisations may indicate a greater degree of information sharing and open discussion of 
top-level policy changes in the NGO.   
 
Women's greater interest in and understanding of the term was reflected in their greater 
propensity to query the effectiveness of concentrating exclusively on women, instead of 
trying to challenge and change the broader context of gender relations.  One woman village 
worker in BRAC said: 'I think BRAC should also work with men because men are unaware 
of women's situation.  It would be good if husbands could be members of VOs.  Then they 
would understand why women come to the Area Office and they won't restrict them' (82).  A 
woman field manager in the government organisation said: 
 
I don't know for sure what gender and development is about but I can tell you that 
women are deprived in this society and I know why -- because women are dominated 
by men.  Unless the attitude, approach, and conception of the men changes, nothing 
will.  If you give me more training etc it will help me but my husband won't change so 
(...) do something to change men's attitudes. (63) 
 
Implicitly, there is a challenge in these perspectives to the legitimacy of programme delivery 
approaches which make women the target of development interventions in isolation from 
attention to institutions which sustain gender inequities.  This was made very clear in a 
statement by a woman field manager in the government programme:  'Without changing 
social structure, income-generating activities cannot change the situation of women.  There 
should be more training on social awareness building but our project is very much credit 
oriented' (19).  For these women staff, their organisations were not going far enough, and the 
frustrations they experienced in their work highlighted failings in programme organisation, 
norms around targeting,  and processes of delivering inputs - failings, that is, if a broader 
conception of women's empowerment were assumed to be the objective of development 
work. 
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Many of the men staff did not see the connection between gender and development concerns 
and their programme work, and instead, assumed that gender equity was about equal 
opportunities within their organisations, and the hiring of greater numbers of women staff.  
Many men acknowledged this to be a sensible policy because of women staff's greater access 
to women beneficiaries in a purdah context.  However, there was also tremendous resistance 
to greater numbers of women staff as they were seen to be siphoning off male jobs, and 
contributing less work to the organisation.  There was also resentment about affirmative 
action measures as these were seen to ignore considerations of merit at recruitment and 
promotion: 
 
GAD advocates that women should come forward like men.  But liberty does not 
mean anarchy.  It is not wise for women to think that they can do what men are doing.  
You cannot change society overnight.  (...) Men should get jobs instead of women.  
Because women spend their money on cosmetics, ornaments, clothes, frivolities.  The 
men spend their money on the family and are under real pressure to run the family.  
Women are not.  If the women help their husbands or brothers to run the family it will 
be less of a burden to men.  Women should be motivated to do this (...)  It is not 
possible for women to get their rights by shouting - nobody gives rights away to 
others.  You should get them yourself according to your qualities, qualifications. 
(NGO field worker, man, 101) 
 
This statement trivialises feminist concerns as the distraction of middle-class women with 
disruptive proclivities, and completely fails to relate gender equity concerns to programme 
outcomes, as opposed to internal management issues.  It is clear that this field worker was 
unwilling to legitimate the presence of his women's colleagues.  In some cases, field workers 
find that their ambivalence about gender equity may be mirrored in a lack of full commitment 
at higher levels.  For example, in the government programme, a senior regional official 
complained about his agency's policy of seeking parity in the numbers of women and men 
field staff:  
 
Actually it is CIDA's initiative [to have women staff].  They are giving priority to the 
women's programme.  Really we only need 25% women and 75% men staff.  I have 
informed Head Office of this, but they say the donors want it so we have to involve 
women.  For physical reasons, women are doing less work [than men]. (50).   
 
This allusion to a largely external impetus for the equal opportunities policy is probably fairly 
accurate.  Policy which is seen to come from an external constituency, without any apparent 
or vocal internal constituency, is considered less legitimate or imperative than policies 
generated in direct response to urgent local needs.  Women staff, of course, viewed this 
differently because their own employment security was at stake.  But they were eager to 
justify their own presence in development by pointing out their greater effectiveness in 
working with rural women: 
 
It is easier for women to do this job because all of the groups are female groups.  And 
women are better at motivating than men are.  Women members can express their 
opinions to the women staff -- they become friendly.  But if it is a male staff member 
he will have to stand outside the house  and get permission to get in.  Sometimes 
women ask that men not be sent to their groups -- they are afraid of men.  Because of 
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this they cannot even understand or listen to the men.  They are too afraid to ask for 
more explanations. (NGO woman field worker, 63) 
 
To return to the perceived legitimacy of the policy of targeting credit and services to poor 
rural women, an important issue regards views on women's personal control over loans.   All 
staff knew that the loss of varying degrees of managerial control over loans to male relatives 
was not a practice intended by policy, and it was women staff who first raised this in 
interviews.  A substantial proportion of staff in both organisations felt that this was a 
problem.  In both organisations, however, more women than men disapproved of the practice:  
61% of the women in BRAC compared to 50% of the men,  and 63% of the women in RD-12 
compared to 40% of their male colleagues.  Women's greater concern over the issue may 
reflect different feelings from men on the subject of women's rights to control financial assets 
within the household, as suggested by the following exchange during a group discussion 
between government field staff: 
 
Man : It isn't true that men have control over the women's money: 
husbands give their wives money, so why shouldn't wives give 
them money?  After a woman has been married off, her 
husband can make her work if he wants to or not if he chooses 
not to.  So that money is the husband's! 
 
Woman: Just as the women take loans and hand over the money to their 
husbands, this happens in the case of female staff as well. 
 
Often men were fatalistic about the problem of women losing control over their loans in a 
context where they had so few opportunities to invest loans profitably.  Some women also 
shared this view: 'It is not a problem that women give money to men.  Our women are 
illiterate and cannot even count so they need reliable people to run their business.  If they 
give money to anyone else it could be worse' (NGO field worker, woman, 96).  But for some 
women, this was a cause of deep frustration: 
 
We try to make women aware, we give loans, we are doing so much work for them 
but still they depend on husbands.  We tell them to do some different business from 
husbands.  But they give their loans immediately to husbands.  I feel bad when they 
give us instalments that come from the husbands.  I want women to get some 
significance in their family and be involved in decision-making.  I don't like the way 
husbands treat wives like dogs.  The official people [like BRAC] are pressuring 
women to leave the home.  They aren't coming out for their own needs.  I can't think 
of what we have to do.  There are crores of husbands, fathers, brothers, and fathers-in-
law - how can I change them all? (NGO field manager, woman, 87) 
 
One woman field worker on the government programme shared a rather critical perspective 
on the situation: 
 
Actually, this credit is a form of dowry.  Women are giving their loans to their 
husbands -- it replaces them having to bring money from their fathers' house - now 
they are getting it through the office.  Because of this loan they get a release from 
wife battery because husbands behave better than before. (51) 
 
21 
She is implying a trade-off between one patriarchal arena to another, from the household to 
the project.  With credit serving as a proxy form of dowry in the context of village groups, 
the basic terms of patriarchal exchanges of women are little altered, though conditions for 
women are somewhat improved.  Dowry is a resource over which women have little direct 
control - it is intended for the use of the husband and his family.  The analogy between credit 
and dowry suggests, therefore, that women's benefit is contingent, not direct; women may 
gain some peace in the household, but there is little contribution to her financial or 
entrepreneurial autonomy. 
 
Differences in women and men's views on the legitimacy of women's husbands using 
women's loans do not reflect on the formal policies of their organisations, but on an informal 
practice which has evolved in the course of programme implementation.  As Ackerly 
suggests in her study of credit organisations in Bangladesh, however, these informal practices 
do reflect on aspects of programme design and delivery; an organisation concerned with the 
problem of male loan use could design incentive structures to discourage it (1995, 1997).  
However, if field workers see no problem with a range of practices which involve under-
achievement on broader objectives such as women's financial empowerment - practices such 
as male loan use, or women investing loans in extremely low-return activities which neither 
shift women's rate of market engagement nor challenge the gender division of labour - they 
may use their discretion to ignore these practices.  Indeed, if such practices do not detract 
from loan repayment, or actually contribute to regular repayment, field workers may 
encourage them.  Field worker patterns of policy enactment - their routines of interaction 
with beneficiaries, reveal how combinations of personal biases and certain programme 
incentives can lead to under-performance on gender equity goals. 
 
Routines of Interaction 
 
Field workers develop routines in their interactions with clients to render the complex 
environment of rural development problems more manageable, and to make their everyday 
work predictable.  This is a characteristic of bureaucratic organisation, of course, where 
simplifying cues, such as eligibility requirements or application procedures, are created in 
order to regularise decision processes (Lipsky, 1980:83).  However, as Lipsky points out, 
'bureaucrats also develop their own patterns of simplification when the official categories 
prove inadequate for expeditious work processing, or if they significantly contradict their 
preferences' (ibid).  In other words, within the constraints of formal institutional 
requirements, there is considerable room for choice over methods of enacting routines.  The 
subjects of routinisation -- programme beneficiaries -- will be affected by the wayfield 
workers process their work, as will, indeed, overall organisational policy, because of the 
recursive effect of the accretion of low-level decision-making on programme outcomes and 
on the knowledge environment which informs policy.  Routines at the field level show 
whether, and how,field workers chose to reinforce or challenge the institutionalisation of 
gender hierarchy in the family and the community. 
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Determining eligibility:  Routine favouritism 
Field workers are expected to select out of their field environments the members of the 
groups they work with according to agency criteria of desert.  BRAC and RD-12 are 
committed to working with the 'poor', which both define as functionally landless: households 
with under 50 decimals of land, and in which the main household labourer works for a wage 
for at least a third of the year.  A familiar problem with establishing criteria like this is that 
official definitions of desert cannot accommodate local variation in need; poverty and social 
exclusion is not always signalled by income levels.  When it comes to women's poverty, 
income measures can be inadequate for indicating women's range of social and economic 
resources;  women from slightly better-off households are not immune to gender-related 
disadvantages, such as systematic under-investment in their human resource development, or 
vulnerability to domestic violence.  Ceilings on group size (about 45 members for BRAC 
VOs and 25 members for MBSSs) mean that significant numbers of deserving potential 
members cannot be included.  Field workers have to make choices over the inclusion or 
exclusion of certain people, in a process which involves reconciling agency targeting goals 
with personal preferences over the people with whom they feel best able to work. 
 
Generally, group creation results from the selection of a sub-sample of eligible households 
following a baseline survey of households in target areas.  Both BRAC and RD-12 have been 
reasonably successful in keeping their memberships within the target group (Montgomery et 
al, 1996: 44 - 45;  Mustafa et al, 1995: 20).  Both, however, have a more highly literate 
membership than the average for Bangladesh, where only 22% of women are literate 
(Mustafa et al: 1995: 23;  Matienzo, 1993: 4).  Given the need to ensure that some group 
members can keep records, and that credit recipients are at least minimally numerate, it is 
unsurprising that field workers favour more literate candidates for membership, especially as 
organisations such as BRAC no longer invest in functional education prior to giving loans, as 
they have done in the past. 
 
RD-12 staff face particular difficulties in avoiding elite-biased privilege systems in forming 
groups.  This is because group formation is mediated through the TBCCAs, whose leadership 
can be tied to local elites, obliging field staff to assign or withhold group membership to 
people according to the needs of local patronage systems.  A woman field worker in RD-12 
described the problem: 
 
If I tell a group I cannot register them or give them credit, the TRDO does support 
me.  The problem is that most of the time she is under pressure from the [TBCCA] 
Chairman to do the opposite and she has to follow him.  I am working under her but 
most of the time the Chairman controls us.  Four months ago I had to organise a 
society.  I went there and formed a group.  I finished all the relevant formalities and 
went to the chairman for registration.  He rejected it because the group wasn't in his 
area of influence.  And he didn't want to see any groups in areas besides his own. (51) 
 
The embeddedness of patronage networks in RD-12's field structure constitutes a deep 
restriction on the positive employment of field worker discretion to assign group membership 
to the most deserving - this affects women and men field workers equally. 
 
Group creation is not just a matter of designating appropriate members.  A critical component 
of the process is motivating people to join by persuading them of the advantages of 
membership.  Field workers must contend with the hostility and suspicion of villagers, which 
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can be exacerbated because of the focus on women, bringing them out of their homes in ways 
which may be unfamiliar, or inadmissible, in the village environment.  Field workers are 
often suspected of Christian evangelising, or involvement in the traffic in women, or of 
breaking up families.  A familiar joke shared by village men is that their wives will be taught 
to reject their husbands and favour the 'bosses' in the development organisation: 'Amar shami 
khalo, amar shahib bhalo'.  Field workers have to establish their credibility within the 
village, and find ways of forming groups without offending powerful local people.  Often, the 
easiest way to do this is to accede to, rather than challenge, local systems of signalling 
prestige and social difference, working through, rather than against, local power brokers.  
This is not just a matter of gaining the approval of local elites such as the leaders of 
community factions or patronage groups (the samaj).  It is also a matter of working through 
individual men, who, as women's husbands, are the power brokers mediating relationships 
between the household and the outside world.  Many male field workers admitted to 
contacting husbands and seeking their permission for their wives to join groups.  Frequently, 
as an inducement, husbands were told that they would soon have access to a loan - though 
their wives.  As one male field worker in the NGO explained: 'husbands know the wife's 
money is their money.  And to motivate men to let women form VOs we tell husbands that 
they will soon get a loan' (85).  
 
Women staff engaged much less frequently in this practice, probably because of gendered 
barriers to interaction between young women staff (who were often unmarried) and male 
strangers, barriers which have great force in a conservative village environment.  The reason 
men staff were more prone to work through village men likewise reflects gendered 
behavioural norms, where it is inappropriate for male visitors to approach women directly, 
and would be considered an affront to the status of village men if male visitors failed to give 
them precedence.  But this male-dominated process of mediating the relationship between the 
development organisation and women beneficiaries reinforces conventions about women's 
lesser stature as village and household members.  It underwrites norms giving them less 
authority and significance in the public arena, and means they participate in development 
programmes on male sufferance.  As much is suggested in the following statement: 
 
When I talk to the VO members I have to negotiate with the men first - and it 
becomes a meeting for the men - instead of a women's meeting.  They say: 'You have 
to tell us things first because the women don't understand.  If you tell us first we'll 
explain it to them' (NGO field worker, man, 73). 
 
In terms of cumulative outcomes, this practice has the effect of subordinating a development 
resource designed for women's benefit to men's community and personal interests.  It makes 
husbands the primary and legitimate interlocutors with field workers, strongly signalling 
women's secondary and subordinate status as legitimate clients of NGO or state services. 
 
Where field worker discretion comes most powerfully into play, however, is in selecting 
members who will actually receive loans.  Both organisations favour an initial screening 
process in which members demonstrate attendance discipline and a capacity to produce 
savings instalments weekly, and also, memorise sets of social 'vows' which are chorused 
together at the beginning of weekly meetings.14  The principles of group-guaranteed 
borrowing stipulate that after this, sub-groups of about 5 members should themselves 
determine a member's creditworthiness.  However, in practice, field workers may intervene to 
make their own assessment of a borrower's repayment capabilities.  Currently, staff 
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performance in both organisations is assessed primarily on the basis of the repayment rates 
they can secure.  This creates powerful incentives to discriminate amongst group members on 
the grounds of likely repayment capacity, at the expense of being catholic about formal 
eligibility.  Observers suggest that this has lead to a tendency to favour borrowers with other 
household resources with which they could repay the loan in case of default - resources such 
as household assets, or such as a husband who could do day labour to repay the loan if the 
loan activity failed, or who, indeed, could invest the loan more profitably than his wife 
(Ackerly, 1997).  Montgomery et al suggest that recently BRAC has been less effective in 
lending to the poorest because of pressure to ensure strong repayment rates: 'It appears that 
two major performance concerns - of targeting and repayment rates - are potentially 
conflicting.  At the field level, targeting is less emphasised than the need to keep repayment 
rates high' (1996: 47).  Members of borrowing sub-groups in the village will probably go 
along with this in their own assessments of the creditworthiness of individuals, given the 
pressure on them to guarantee, collectively, loan repayment in case of default by individual 
members. 
 
The result is that sometimes potentially deserving members - particularly women without 
male support - are denied loans, or are permitted to borrow only for very traditional, 
homestead-based sex-typed activities.  In doing this, field workers are involved in reinforcing 
some of the ground rules of the gender division of labour and the purdah system.  This 
practice can be reinforced at an organisational level because field staff often have to get 
approval from their local offices for their selection of eligible borrowers, and concerns to 
keep local aggregate repayment rates high leads to great conservatism over borrower 
eligibility.  In the government programme, this problem is exacerbated by the fact that all 
loans must be approved through the local TBCCA, which, as noted earlier, is dominated by 
men.  One chairman of a TBCCA explained that he differentiates between the kinds of loans 
he approves for women according to whether she has a husband or not.  If she does not, he 
only approves loans for chicken, goat, or cow rearing, which can be done within her 
compound.  If she is married, then he approves loans for rickshaws, even though officially 
there is no category of loan for rickshaw purchases, on the grounds that these are not driven 
by women.  Biases such as these on the part of the loan approving authority limit the 
likelihood that field workers will promote women's greater control over their loans. 
 
Women staff tended to be most aware of these problems, and expressed frustration over their 
failures to defend women's rights to independent access to loans, as the following two 
statements from women government field workers suggest: 
 
One woman gave her loan to her husband.  But he refused to repay the money.  She 
had so many problems getting money from him - and had to repay by selling eggs, 
chicks, etc.  He also beat her when she tried to get loan instalments from him.  She 
managed to repay and asked for another.  But she told the field workers that she didn't 
want money to go to the husband.  She said: "Give me the cash, I'll buy a cow".  On 
the loan disbursement day, the husband came to the office to get the money.  The 
woman told the office to forget she had a husband.  "Think of me as husband-less and 
give me the money."  When the office tried to give it to the husband she said: "Look, I 
am under double pressure, from my husband who won't repay and you who want my 
money back".  She went and bought a cow with the husband and the field workers and 
brought it close to her house in the village so she could control it, in case the husband 
tries to take it away. (52) 
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One woman who had neither children nor a husband was doing domestic labour, and 
became a samity member and applied for a loan.  I supported her loan proposal for a 
small trade business but the office did not approve it.  The office said she has no 
husband or son so how will she run the business?  I think she could have - that's why I 
proposed her! (58). 
 
As will be shown shortly, women staff sometimes used their discretion to subvert dominant 
loan approval practices by encouraging women borrowers to take stronger charge over their 
loans, and to take advantage of programme membership in other ways. 
 
Limiting Demand:  Routine Dissuasion 
Field workers have no control over the social and economic environments of beneficiaries, 
and as the last on the list in their bureaucratic hierarchies, they have the least control over the 
sorts of programme inputs which their superiors deem appropriate.  Where they do exercise 
control is over the amount of information about the programme which they share with 
beneficiaries.  In order to enhance the authoritativeness of their positions vis a vis 
beneficiaries. they have an interest in limiting beneficiaries' demands to what they feel is the 
least trouble to deliver.  The amount of information a field workers bureaucrat will share 
depends on constraints in the programme delivery system, personal workloads, their 
conceptions of beneficiaries' capabilities, and their conceptions of their own roles.  
 
In both organisations, the most obvious demand limitation occurs in the sphere of loan 
approval, where the majority of loans approved for women are for relatively small, 
homestead-based, traditional activities.  There are no cases in RD-12, for example, of women 
taking advantage of the facility to borrow up to 8000 TK at a time.   BRAC, however, 
experiments with a range of non-traditional small enterprises for women which are offered in 
tandem with skills training, provision of inputs, and marketing assistance.  This is a very 
positive effort to expand the range of women's investment activities.  In the absence of 
measures to enhance women's direct management control over these activities, however, 
there have been some problems of women borrowers remaining marginal to managing the 
investment, as suggested in a BRAC study of problems faced by women taking loans to run 
small restaurants (Khan, 1993). 
Limiting demand to fail-safe conventional activities for women borrowers, or to activities in 
which husbands can be sure of gaining profits, is a practical response to organisational 
incentives to ensure high repayment rates, especially where, in the case of the NGO, failure 
to achieve a 100% repayment rate can sometimes be punished by a salary cut.  However, 
evidence emerged from interviews with borrowers of loan use which deviated significantly 
from approved activities.  This was not just a matter of loans being used by other family 
members, but loans being used by women for highly profitable activities such as on-lending 
to other women, hoarding commodities, or dealing in goods smuggled from India such as 
saris.  These activities are frowned on because they were seen as contributing to market 
distortions.  And field workers claimed ignorance of them.  However, women borrowers 
intimated some degree of collusion with field workers on this.  Both women and men field 
workers were using their discretion to turn a blind eye to such activities out of respect for the 
high profits they could yield.  These activities also allowed women borrowers a greater 
degree of loan control.  Field workers also sometimes exercised discretion in tacitly 
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approving loans for consumption purposes, in recognition of the fact that women borrowers 
were sometimes under great pressure to pay for emergency medical expenses, or dowries for 
daughters.  This was not necessarily motivated by a desire to enhance women's financial 
independence, but rather, in reaction to the limitations of approved investment activities. 
Some field workers,  mostly women, made efforts to encourage women to get more out of 
their loans by helping them to enhance their market knowledge and control over the loan 
activity.  Some women in both programmes, for example, encouraged borrowers to only give 
part of their loans to their husbands, and they encouraged husbands to accept this.  This was 
out of recognition of women's difficulty in insisting on individual rights to the cash within 
their households, and was a way of working within existing gender relations while securing 
some gain for women.  Others were more direct.  For example, a woman field manager on the 
NGO tried to encourage women who had taken loans for small restaurant businesses (a non-
traditional activity) to resist their husbands' taking control of the business: 
For example, here I am a woman, in a restaurant...that's out of the question.  Oh my 
God!  It is a degrading job!  I have made these women open a restaurant.  If I tell 
them to sit there, they say, "Apa15, I feel embarrassed!"  I used to go and sit there 
myself.  If a customer came, I might have taken them over a thing or two.  I've said, 
"Serve them that."  That's how I got the women into the habit, you know?  Every day, 
after I had finished my work in the field, I would go to the restaurant and sit with one 
of the women until six or seven in the evening.  I've got them so used to it, that they 
don't even trust their husbands.  They say, "Who knows what they might do with the 
money, they might spend it."  I feel very good about the fact that I have been able to 
help them develop somewhat. (extract from an oral history, Maya Rani16) 
 
These forms of active intervention in the loan use process represented an application of their 
discretion to circumvent constraints embedded in programme structure, to promote outcomes 
in the interests of women borrowers.  These activities also pitted women field workers along 
with women borrowers as partners in struggles against local social constraints.  Developing a 
sense of collective engagement enhances the participatory nature of the programme, in which 
women beneficiaries become constituents, rather than clients, of the organisation - something 
which is one of the objectives of genuinely participatory rural development administration. 
 
Both BRAC and RD-12 append a range of social development concerns and activities to their 
credit programmes.  However, the dominance of the incentive to secure high repayment, 
which, unlike social development outcomes, is easy to quantify and to hold up as a personal 
achievement, distorts field worker routines into an increasingly exclusive focus on credit 
matters.  A village woman, a leader of one of the government MBSS groups, described the 
disjunction between the information desired by her group, and that received from their field 
worker: 
 
We discuss matters of domestic violence amongst ourselves in the samity, but we 
haven't received any training from the office to help us deal with these situations.  We 
haven't received training on family planning so we don't know about how to plan 
families.  Members are eager to receive this kind of information.  We also ask the 
office about it.  Once, some officers came from Dhaka for data collection and we told 
them about it. The other day, three women came and we told them as well.  We 
haven't received any information except,  "Save regularly, take and repay loans 
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properly, don't miss weekly instalments."  This is what we are getting. (extract from 
an oral history, Dolan Begum, Bogra) 
 
This statement suggests that demand management occurs in another important sphere:  over 
the degree to which knowledge about women's legal rights and reproductive health is shared.  
Field worker training, in fact, rarely equips them with the capacity to share much more than 
general platitudes on these subjects.  In the RPP, although its 'human development' training 
for field workers includes an introduction to women's social and economic needs, this does 
not include training in legal literacy or women's rights in the family.  In any case, training 
related to analysing inequality and the ways it is maintained is neglected in favour of 
technical and accounting training (Lappin, 1989).  Women's personal struggles over dowry, 
polygamy, divorce, or domestic violence are not prioritised for discussion in group meetings, 
nor is there space in management reports to mention these issues.  In BRAC, there is more 
respect for the relevance of these issues, and they are addressed through separate 
programmes:  the Women's Health Development Programme and the Human Rights and 
Legal Education programme, both of which have separate cadres of field staff from the credit 
programme.  Nevertheless, field staff on the credit programme often have to confront 
problems of abuse of women's rights - for example, where violent husbands keep their wives 
from attending meetings.  Not trained in basic knowledge of the law or of procedures for 
prosecuting cases of domestic violence, dowry, or abandonment in local Family Courts, field 
workers may, by default, dissuade group members from pursuing these issues.   
 
As for family planning, male field workers are particularly constrained from raising these 
issues with women because of modesty conventions around discussions of sex.  Women field 
workers also avoid engagement in discussions of family planning, though for other reasons.  
One, if they are unmarried, such discussions are seen by both themselves and village women 
as greatly inappropriate.  And two, because it is considered to be insultingly low status to be 
associated with family planning extension workers, who, in national health programmes, tend 
to be poorly paid older village women, rather different from the dynamic, young and well-
educated cadre of women development agents on credit programmes. 
 
In both programmes women staff were much more likely than men staff to raise concerns 
about their programme's lack of attention to 'social awareness' training for women, and to 
point out that domestic violence was a serious problem in their work in the village.  They also 
drew connections between enhancing women's legal and social status in relation to men, and 
improving women's chances of achieving financial independence.  Men, in contrast, often 
saw the latter as a mere technical matter of enhancing women's skills endowment or access to 
wage employment, not of challenging gender relations.  In other words, women staff saw 
their agency's neglect of issues such as violence, men's negative attitudes, and women's lack 
of rights in the family as direct constraints on their work.  As a woman field worker in the 
NGO said:  'We are working for social awareness but all we do is teach women to sign their 
names -- we need more than that.  But in our Functional Education training that is all they 
learn' (92). 
 
In spite of their own lack of training, some women took this problem into their own hands.  
One woman field worker on the government programme explained that she raised issues of 
women's legal rights with her samity members, even though she herself had no training in 
this area, and was not completely sure about these things: 
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I talk about the Union Parishad chairmen and their neglect of these matters.  The UP 
chairmen are supposed to look after women's issues and have legal power.  But as 
men, needing men's votes, they don't judge in favour of women.  The UP people don't 
even know the law themselves -- for example about divorce and maintenance. (52) 
 
Men, on the other hand, claimed that issues of women's rights and male attitudes rarely came 
up in their meetings with women; evidence of the dissuasive effect of their gender on 
women's capacity to speak of personal problems.  In meetings with village men, male staff 
were also reluctant to bring up these issues, partly because of the status losses they might 
experience if seen to be overly sympathetic with women's interests: 
 
Dowry, violence against women... men aren't interested in hearing about these things 
and don't even react.  And men who talk about these things are not respected by men.  
And anyway, we don't reflect these things in our own lives.  (NGO field worker, man, 
97) 
 
Encouraging Deference:  Routine Distancing 
Field workers  work in a social context in which status distinctions are rigorously cultivated 
and are signalled by the extreme deference which inferiors by class, age, and gender show 
their superiors.  Deferential behaviour is particularly deeply embedded in relations between 
the government and people.  NGOs, though more alert to the need to overcome elitism and 
paternalism, have not entirely avoided this problem.  Deferential behaviour is an almost 
automatic part of any field-worker - beneficiary interaction, but in 'participatory' rural 
development programmes, field workers are enjoined to minimise deference and social 
distance.  However, field workers have an interest in actively encouraging deference in order 
to limit beneficiary demands on their time, and to keep levels of expectation in check. 
 
There are an infinite number of ways of reminding subordinates of social distance, quite aside 
from the ample signals provided by better dress and language.  In both organisations, 
deference control is evident in practices such as taking the highest or best seat while the 
majority of group members sit on the ground, addressing individual group members in 
familiar terms but accepting formal forms of address in return, and minimising dialogue in 
favour of one-way lecturing.  Group members are expected to be punctual for meetings which 
may not coincide with their own work schedules, while field workers may arrive late.  
Beneficiary deference was most marked in relation to men staff, as might be expected given 
that their gender gives them a premium on status.  This culture of deference has been noted in 
government organisations in particular.  For example in another discussion of the RPP,  
Wood talks of field workers' 'command' relationships with the poor, signalled by the titles 'sir' 
and 'sahib' with which groups address them (1988: 24).   
 
Beneficiaries, in the interest of ingratiating themselves with field workers, learn to 'manage' 
their identities, and in accordance with the expectations of field workers, become submissive 
and undemanding.  One man field worker in the NGO described group reactions to 
discussions of issues such as divorce, early marriage, dowry, usury, the difference between 
informal and formal credit: 'Groups don't react or feedback to this.  They think that it is our 
work to tell them and their work to listen.  But it doesn't become part of their life' (85).  There 
is no perception here that participation and interaction must be actively elicited where large 
status differences between interlocutors silence the subordinate party. 
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There are distinctly gendered patterns in deferential behaviour cultivated in beneficiaries, 
evident from the ways men and women beneficiary behaviour is described.   As mentioned 
earlier, men beneficiaries may be described as 'touts', and their groups, sometimes with 
uncomfortable default rates, may be described as 'rebellious' or 'chaotic'.  Women's groups 
are described as 'diligent' or 'sincere'.  But as the following comment from a male field 
worker on the government organisation suggests, these 'virtues' are somewhat tainted by their 
association with femininity:  'Why are women more sincere?  Because men are smarter.  
Women cannot even think of being insincere.  And women cannot contemplate losing their 
prestige' (43).  The suggestion that women's lack of cleverness keeps them honest feeds into, 
of course, assumptions about differences in gendered identities and social possibilities.  It is 
also fed back to beneficiaries in terms of limited expectations as to their capabilities and 
behaviour. 
 
Gender is also treated as a resource in promoting deference.  Some men staff insisted that 
their gender afforded them greater authority than their women colleagues in village work: 
 
It is easier in the samities for men because village women are always afraid of men - 
they respect us.  They think that when men go to the women's group, he's the big sir.  
They don't respect the women field staff to the same degree' (government field 
worker, man, 53). 
 
Women staff equally argued that their gender was a positive resource in allowing them closer 
access to village women, and they insisted that village women were much more likely to raise 
gender-related issues such as personal rights and reproductive health with them, and not with 
men.  This suggests more success in eliciting open exchange rather than passive reception, a 
contribution to processes of empowerment.  It also represents a subversion of gendered social 
hierarchies with men leading and women obeying.   
 
It is important not to assume any natural sisterhood between women staff and beneficiaries.   
In both organizations, as noted earlier, field workers and beneficiaries are positioned far apart 
on class and other social hierarchies, with most regular field staff coming from middle class, 
largely urban backgrounds.  What is ironic, however, is that the women staff closest to 
beneficiaries in terms of class status - BRAC's village level Programme Assistants, many of 
whom come from villages, and from families that may be barely solvent, were the most 
reluctant to identify similarities between themselves and women beneficiaries.  They were 
anxious to stress and indeed exaggerate class differences with village women, and were 
uncomfortable with acknowledging any shared experiences on the basis of gender.  Perhaps 
the very low organizational status of PAs was contributing to their efforts to insist upon 
status by other means, particularly by emphasising their distance and difference from poor 
women.  Given their position at the bottom of organizational hierarchies, it was in their 
interests to stress their identification with male colleagues and the organization, not village 
women.  Another irony is that, in contrast,  RD-12 women staff, who were overall more 
educated and more likely to have an urban background than BRAC women,  showed a 
stronger propensity to identify gender-based similarities between themselves and village 
women, rather than class differences (71% of RD-12 women pointed out similarities 
compared to 63% of BRAC women).   
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These findings warn against assuming a simple correlation between class and attitudes.  They 
also, very importantly, warn against assuming a commonality in women's interests.  For this 
reason, it is best not to make the case for investing in women field workers on the grounds 
that they are always more effective than men in reaching rural women.  As Jackson suggests 
in this volume, 'the case for women field workers is better made on the grounds of the 
importance of offering positive role models to women, (...) rather than on the, instrumental, 
grounds of "doing participation better"'(1997, forthcoming). 
 
Self-perceptions:  heroes or mediocrats? 
 
Field workers' assessments of their own roles reflect coping responses to their work 
experiences.  Where there is little incentive to promote counter-cultural goals like gender or 
social equity, they can lower their expectations of their work missions, rationalising under-
achievement on gender policy goals. 
 
In both programmes, many field workers described their work as involving, primarily, credit 
management, not social development.  Although BRAC staff overall were more likely to see 
themselves as champions of the interests of the poor than RD-12 staff, the business of 
monitoring loan disbursal and repayment was clearly dominant. Asked about their 
perspective on their own influence and impact within their organisations, RD-12 staff had a 
much less positive view than BRAC staff.  This reflects the more decentralised organisation 
of authority and decision-making in BRAC, giving scope for greater participation by field 
workers than in RD-12's more conventionally hierarchical structure. 
 
In RD-12, field workers faced the great disadvantage of being on the margins of the regular 
civil service.  They are stranded at the field level by a lack of promotion prospects, as 
advance to the next step on the hierarchy depends upon the accretion of university 
qualifications and personal contacts, not field experience.   As one woman field manager 
said: 'I feel frustrated.  One shouldn't bother having ambition in our government department 
because there are irregularities.  In an NGO I can expect something  I have worked here eight 
years and have nothing for it' (20).   Isolation in the field without prospects for advance can 
lead to a deep schism between the interests of policy makers and field workers,  Since career 
prospects are not notably enhanced by good performance, there is less incentive for loyalty to 
top-level policy objectives.  This situation is much worsened by the fact that these field 
workers are formally officers of the TBCCA system, not of the civil service.  This ties their 
interests to local power elites.  As has been suggested, these local interests are not in the least 
oriented to promoting gender equity in development, and this creates powerful disincentives 
for field workers to champion counter-cultural causes such as women's - or the poor's - 
empowerment. 
 
In BRAC, in contrast, field experience is highly valued.  No appointments are made laterally 
to management positions; all local and regional managers must serve a minimum of two years 
as Programme Officers.  Commitment to the organisation is strong, as are individuals' 
expectations of advance through the system on the grounds of merit. 
 
In both organisations there was a marked difference between women and men's perceptions 
of their own influence in the organisation, with women field staff distinctly less confident of 
their capacity to bring their own perspectives to bear on decision-making.  In BRAC, 44% 
percent of women staff had a positive feeling about their influence on the organisation 
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compared to 65% of the men.  In RD-12,  just 14% of the women felt positive compared to 
40% of the men.  Many felt excluded from decision-making, or felt they were actively 
ignored or undermined, on the grounds of their gender.  As a woman field worker in BRAC 
said:  'All major responsibilities are given to male POs - they don't want to give us priority.  
Instead, our capacity to do our jobs is always questioned' (24).  And a woman counterpart in 
RD-12 said: 'Our authorities give more importance to our male colleagues than us.  When 
there are any kind of work discussions I point out that I am the senior FO here - but it is still 
the younger men who get listened to' (52). 
 
Nevertheless, many women expressed a sense of pride and achievement in their work with 
rural women.  Unlike men, who might stress technical achievements, such as good records of 
repayment rates, women reported ways in which they had supported village women in 
protesting violence, or obstructing polygamous marriages.  This is a source of a new sense of 
heroism in the interests of women, as suggested by this NGO field manager: 
 
I have solved many problems (...)  No, it is not correct that I solve the problems.  I 
inspire the women and encourage them to solve their problems.  That's why a 
thousand people respect me.  (...) Apa, perhaps I had visualised my future in a 
different way, but when I look at them I don't think I could only look after my own 
family.  I will think about a thousand families, that's what makes me happy. (Oral 
history, Maya Rani). 
 
Women field staff are in a curious position.  They are social pioneers, modelling new 
possibilities for female identity and affectivity in public, yet they face tremendous criticism 
for trespassing across gender boundaries.  One NGO field manager  described herself as 
'Phulan Devi' - the bandit queen admired for her courage but a social outlaw nonetheless.  
Some of the worst ostracism comes from within their own organisations, where their male 
colleagues may treat them with scorn, and where women, as a minority, are marginal to 
decision-making, and are unable to gain a hearing for possible alternative or opposition 
perspectives on policy. 
 
Conclusions 
 
Had this been a discussion about differences between an NGO and government organisation 
in terms of effective responses to poverty as shown through the flexibility and quality of 
delivery systems, democracy of decision-making, and capacity to learn from mistakes, the 
NGO would probably have come out looking better, confirming contemporary prejudices as 
to the comparative advantage of NGOs in responding to needs at the grass roots (Edwards 
and Hulme, 1996: Chapter 1).  This conclusion would have been somewhat tempered by the 
way the current preoccupation amongst aid donors with financial sustainability is making 
NGO and government  credit programmes resemble each other more than ever before.  NGOs 
are having to neglect their concerns with class mobilisation and broader human development 
goals in favour of stricter financial management, which is imposing stiffer degrees of 
bureaucratisation and a more corporate than collective culture (White, 1991;  Rao and 
Kelleher, 1995).   On the other hand, government programmes such as the RPP which depend 
on external funding are having to intensify financial control mechanisms and demand higher 
performance from staff in terms of securing respectable repayment rates (Goetz and Sen 
Gupta, 1996: 57).  Nevertheless, differences in the structure and culture of NGOs and public 
sector institutions remain, most notably, the NGOs' greater success in communicating policy 
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changes from the top down to the field, as evident in the greater awareness amongst the 
NGO's staff members of the existence and meaning of a GAD policy.  Another difference is 
evidence of a greater sensitivity to issues of social equity amongst both women and men staff 
in the NGO. 
 
This paper, however, has suggested that administrative and cultural differences typical of 
NGOs and public sector organisations do not necessarily create incentives for greater local-
level receptivity to women's needs in development.  Instead, the differences which cut across 
both organisations in the perspectives and behaviour of women and men field workers, 
suggest the importance of gender in determining how staff respond to incentives and use their 
discretion.  In other words, the embeddedness of discriminatory class and gender distinctions 
in the RPP's procedures for approving loans or creating village groups does not entirely 
prohibit its women staff from developing and acting upon alternative perspectives on policy.  
And alternatively, while BRAC's more egalitarian culture and freedom from local power 
groups may foster more awareness amongst its male staff as to the needs their female 
clientele (as suggested by their greater propensity to disapprove of husbands' appropriation of 
loans), this does not produce incentives and administrative approaches to enhancing women's 
independence in controlling credit.  Evidence for this, in this study, is that there was little 
significant difference between women's rates of control over their loans between either 
organisation: 28% of the women borrowers in BRAC had complete or very high control over 
their loans, compared to 31% in RD-12 (Goetz and Sen Gupta, 1996:60). 
 
The gender of field workers, not just organisation structures, appears as a critical dimension 
explaining local-level receptivity to women's needs. 
 
Field worker discretion, however subtle and molecular, is an inherently political practice; 
power, stemming from positions within development organisations, institutions of personal 
connections, and systems of class and gender difference, is deployed in the construction and 
reproduction of gender or class relations.  Field worker routines and attitudes are indicative 
of how they construe and construct their beneficiaries as subjects.  The ways gender 
inequalities are experienced by beneficiaries can be affected by the ways field workers 
symbolically mediate reality, because they can give weight to their interpretations by 
assigning or withholding resources and information.  Such practices affect the self-
interpretations of beneficiaries and their consequent capacities to utilise programme benefits 
or to make demands of programme staff and public resources.  The work of lower-level 
bureaucrats becomes part of the cultural knowledge which in aggregate informs the dominant 
discourse of gender policy within the organisation, and at the micro-level, constructs 
experiences of gender difference and inequality.  The domain of field worker discretion thus 
becomes a political arena in which dominant social practices can be reproduced, or what 
Foucault calls 'subjugated  knowledges' can stage their chaotic, localised insurrections 
(1972:81). 
 
The dominant pattern is for discretion to be used in a negative way, in order to minimise 
potential conflict around new policy measures, both outside of and within organisations.  
When it comes to GAD policy, field workers may or may not share in a general institutional 
ambivalence to gender-redistributive policy, but given the precarity of their career positions 
within their organisations, their options are limited to compliance with dominant attitudes, or 
a very risky commitment to more expansive policy goals.  The latter option is generally 
available only to the maverick or the subversive.  It is in the day to day interactions with 
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beneficiaries that the re-routing of policy goals of empowerment towards mere input-delivery 
is achieved.  Subversions do occur, however.  The space provided by the discretion of field 
workers can also be used - if covertly - to expand on the way knowledge and resources are 
delivered in the field.  Because field workers constantly interact with beneficiaries they are in 
a position to retain an awareness of their real needs and capabilities.  Some field workers can 
'know differently' (Smith, 1979:12) about the needs and capacities of their beneficiaries.  
These alternative interpretations can come out in the space provided by their personal 
discretion in implementing policy. 
 
The focus on field workers' practices and perspectives - their discourses of interaction with 
beneficiaries and each other - is not intended to underspecify the importance of structures 
which generate the seeming intractability of male power; structures of class and gender 
discrimination which may be embedded in the organisational form and delivery systems of 
development organisations.  But the focus on actors' perspectives does suggest that such 
structures cannot usefully be identified independently of the way that they manifest 
themselves in the representations upon which people rely to understand the social processes 
of which they are a part.  To focus on the representations of field workers is to suggest that 
social actors are not insensible to the circumstances and consequences of their actions; that 
these are 'knowing' agents contributing to the continuity or transformation of systems of 
domination.   
 
The distinct gender differences in the ways field workers deploy their discretionary powers 
could be an important resource for programme efforts to disrupt the social organisation of 
gender difference and inequality.  However, it is important not to romanticise these 
subversions, to make more of them than they are.  By any standards of measurement, they 
represent minute, molecular expressions of opposition perspectives.  Also, it cannot be 
assumed that these subversions are the expression of some natural solidarity or sisterhood 
between women field workers and their beneficiaries.  Whatever their class backgrounds, 
their primary reference group is likely to be their male colleagues and superiors, not their 
clients.  This is especially so since they are minorities in their organisations, especially at 
decision-making levels.  Organisation theory confirms that minorities in bureaucracies have 
the least interest in challenging dominant agency practices because of the precariousness of 
their career positions.  The few women who are in positions of power in organisations may 
not have any interest in identifying with or promoting the interests of women at other levels 
in the hierarchy.  Feminist critiques of organisation theory point out that even when women 
are not in an absolute minority - what Kanter calls a 'balanced group' (1977:239) with staffing 
proportions which RD-12 is achieving - their 'minority' social status outside of organisations, 
as well as the masculine interests embedded in organisation structures and cultures, continue 
to obstruct  women's capacity for independence of action, reflection, or influence on practices 
and policies (Dahlerup, 1988).  As such, Bangladeshi women field workers, as socially 
devalued individuals doing organisationally under prioritised work from minority positions in 
male-dominated agencies, are the most 'kuccha' of all bureaucrats. 
 
This paper has not suggested a completely clear gender difference in the policy 
interpretations and  enactment routines of women and men field workers.  Some men share 
more expansive views on women's rights to development resources, some women are entirely 
bound by dominant and limiting policy interpretations which reinforce gendered resource 
asymmetries.  Women staff are not receptive to the needs of poor women in a predictable 
way, as suggested by the fact that the lowest-level women village workers were at pains to 
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deny their village backgrounds and class affinities with beneficiaries.  Because of this, it 
cannot be assumed that women staff will necessarily promote poor women's interests in 
development.  Nor should men be dismissed as agents for positive change in women's lives.  
Men are likely to retain a substantial presence in the field staff of these organisations, 
whatever the success of efforts to recruit more women.  Currently the majority of women's 
groups in BRAC, and half of the women's groups in RD-12, are serviced by male staff, and it 
is important to bear this in mind when considering how to pursue a GAD agenda under these 
circumstances. 
 
There is a case for investing in women staff's positive use of their discretion, and for 
counteracting men and women's negative discretionary practices with regard to gender 
relations through new incentives and perhaps gender training.  Investing in the positive use of 
field worker discretion might involve more actively factoring gender equity concerns into 
programme design.  This could involve challenging certain patterns of re-enacting gender 
difference and disprivilege by, for example, creating incentives to promote women's control 
over their loans, and creating incentives for husbands to respect women's economic and 
social rights.  Investing in women's discretion in particular would involve efforts to cultivate 
women's 'voice' within development organisations to validate women's perspectives on 
programme delivery.  This might be achieved through facilitating women's access to 
decision-making fora, and through promoting opportunities for women field workers to 
develop cultures of mutual support; a critical determinant of their capacity to sustain and act 
upon opposition or counter cultural perspectives. 
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1  Thanks to Mick Howes and Elizabeth Harrison for their comments on drafts of this paper. 
2 'Beneficiaries' is used here to describe the people who are designated in policy as the recipients of 
development inputs and services.  It is an inadequate term.  'Beneficiaries' can be direct, active 'participants' or 
'members' of the development programme in question, or they can be passive, receptive 'clients.  In a 
development context, the more formal construction of 'client' seems inappropriate for the participatory 
interventions intended by the kinds of rural development programmes discussed in this chapter.  See Wood 
1986 for a discussion of issues involved in choosing terminology to describe the 'targets' of policy. 
3  These internal institutional reform efforts have made the developing country state the culprit in cases of 
economic crisis, and have detracted from attention to the negative impact of the international political economy 
on developing economies. 
4 I am grateful to the UK's Economic and Social Research Council, which funded this research, and to the 
Canadian International Development Agency, which provided a small grant for the dissemination of the 
research results in Bangladesh.  I thank BRAC and RD-12 for their generosity and openness in allowing me to 
conduct research on their organisations.  I am grateful to Rina Sen Gupta, my research partner, with whom the 
field work was conducted between February and October 1993.  The study also benefited from the very able 
research assistance of Rina Roy in Bangladesh and Cathy Green in the UK.  All empirical and interpretative 
errors, of course, are my own. 
5  All interviews, group discussions, and oral histories were conducted in Bengali and were immediately 
translated and transcribed.  Interviews are numbered and citations from individual interviews are followed by a 
number in brackets to indicate the source interview.   
6  RD-12 is funded by the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA). 
7  reasons for the differential retention rate of women staff in BRAC and RD-12 are explored in Goetz, 1996. 
8  The Thana is an administrative unit between the District  and the Union levels.  RD-12 Thana Offices 
correspond to BRAC Area Offices. 
9 'Bittaheen' means landless. 
10  Only three TBCCAs across the 139 Thanas in which RD-12 operates were chaired by women at the time of 
this study. 
11 Numbers in brackets refer to the individual interview from which the statement is taken. 
12  This distinction between 'cases' and 'stories' is taken from Wood's discussion of 'labelling' in development 
policy (1985).  'Cases' fragment people's identities into elements which policy finds significant, while 'stories' 
provide a broader account of people's social background and of processes of social exclusion. 
13  In women's NGOs however, commitment to gender equity can often be a job requirement.  See Tahera 
Yasmin's discussion of recruitment procedures for Shaptagram Nari Swanivar Parishad, a respected women's 
development NGO in Bangladesh, 1997. 
14  These vows, 17 in BRAC, ten in RD-12, express values and objectives which both organisations are trying to 
promote -- such as village-level solidarity and mutual help, improved sanitary practices, and the elimination of 
dowry and domestic violence. 
15 'Apa' is a respectful form of address to other women, meaning 'sister'.  Its Hindu equivalent is 'Didi'. 
16   In references for the oral histories, all names have been changed. 
